Quantum Miss-in-the-Middle Attack by Xie, Huiqin & Yang, Li
ar
X
iv
:1
81
2.
08
49
9v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
20
 D
ec
 20
18
Quantum Miss-in-the-Middle Attack
Huiqin Xie1,2 , Li Yang1,2∗
1.State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Information Engineering,
Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100093, China
2.School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049,
China
Abstract
We apply Simon’s algorithm to the miss-in-the-middle technique and propose
a quantum algorithm for finding impossible differentials of a general block
cipher. We prove that, under certain assumption on the block cipher, the dif-
ferentials output by the quantum algorithm are key-independent impossible
differentials of the block cipher with a overwhelming probability. Moreover,
we demonstrate that if the traditional miss-in-the-middle attack works for
the block cipher, the proposed quantum algorithm will always work as well.
By contrast, the quantum version of miss-in-the-middle technique proposed
in this paper to some extent compensates for the disadvantages of traditional
miss-in-the-middle technique that the successful probability decreases greatly
with the increase of the number of rounds.
Keywords: post-quantum cryptography, quantum cryptanalysis,
impossible differential cryptanalysis, quantum algorithm, miss-in-the-middle
1. Introduction
In recent years, Simon’s algorithm [1] has been widely used for cryptanal-
ysis of symmetric ciphers. For instance, Kuwakado and Morri constructed
a quantum distinguisher for 3-round Feistel scheme by using Simon’s algo-
rithm [2]. Afterwards, they use Simon’s to recover the key of Even-Mansour
scheme [3]. Santoli and Schaffiner latter extend the result in [2] and pro-
pose a quantum algorithm to forge tags of CBC-MAC scheme [4]. In [5],
∗Corresponding author email: yangli@iie.ac.cn
Kaplan et al. also use Simon’s algorithm to attack symmetric cryptosys-
tems, including PMAC, CLOC and so on. Roetteler and Steinwandt apply
Simon’s algorithm to related-key attack [6]. Afterwards, Hosoyamada and
Aoki use Simon’s algorithm to extract the key of two-round Even-Mansour
scheme [7]. In this paper, we apply Simon’s algorithm to the miss-in-the-
middle technique, and propose a quantum algorithm for finding impossible
differentials of block ciphers.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly discuss the notations and definitions used in
this paper. For any multi-output Boolean function F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, a
vector a ∈ {0, 1}n is called a linear structure of F if, there exists a vector
b ∈ {0, 1}m such that
F (x⊕ a)⊕ F (x) = b, ∀x ∈ {0, 1}n,
where⊕ denotes the bitwise exclusive-or. When b is equal to them-dimensional
zero vector 0m, a is called a period of F .
2.1. Simon’s algorithm
Simon’s algorithm was proposed in 1994 [1]. It solves the following prob-
lem: given a function F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m with the promise that there
exists a vector s ∈ {0, 1}n such that
[F (x) = F (y)]⇔ [x⊕ y ∈ {0n, s}], ∀x, y ∈ {0, 1}n,
find the period s. Any function having such a period s is called satisfying
Simon’s promise. For any classical algorithm, Ω(2n/2) classical queries to F
are needed to find s [8], while Simon’s algorithm only needs O(n) quantum
queries to F . With the access to a quantum oracle which computes f in
superposition, Simon’s algorithm repeats the following steps:
1. Prepare a n +m-qubits initial state |0〉|0〉, then perform the Hadamard
transform H⊗n on the first register, giving
1√
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
|x〉|0〉.
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2. Quantum query to F results in the state
1√
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
|x〉|f(x)〉.
3. Measure the second register in the computational basis, then get a value
F (z) and the first register is collapsed to the state:
1√
2
(|z〉+ |z ⊕ s〉).
4. Apply the Hadamard transform H⊗n to the first register again, giving:
1√
2
1√
2n
∑
y ∈ {0, 1}n(−1)y·z[1 + (−1)y·s]|y〉.
5. Measure the above state in the computational basis. Since any vector y
satisfying y · s = 1 have amplitude 0, the measurement always yields a
random y such that y · s = 0.
Repeating the above steps for O(n) times gives n−1 independent vectors
orthogonal to s, then one can recover s efficiently by basic linear algebra.
Running Simon’s algorithm in F needs n + m qubits and O(2n2 + n|F |Q)
universal gates, where |F |Q denotes the amount of universal gates required
for executing the unitary operator:
UF : |x〉|y〉 → |x〉|y ⊕ F (x)〉.
3. Extended application scenario of Simon’s algorithm
3.1. Simon’s algorithm with multiple periods
In order to use Simon’s algorithm to the miss-in-the-middle attack, we
need to deal with the scenario where the given function may have multiple
periods. Consider an arbitrary multi-output Boolean function F : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}m. It is easy to see that all periods of F constitute a subspace of n-
dimensional linear space over F2. Let SF be the subspace constructed by
the periods of F and s1, s2 · · · , st denotes a basis of SF . That is, SF =
span{s1, · · · , st}. If for any x, y ∈ {0, 1}n, it holds that
[F (x) = F (y)]⇔ [x⊕ y ∈ SF ],
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we say that F satisfies the generalized Simon’s promise.
The following lemma shows that Simon’s algorithm still works even if the
given function only satisfies the generalized Simon’s promise.
Lemma 1. Executing steps 1-5 of Simon’s algorithm on F always gives a
random vector y ∈ S⊥F , i.e.
y · s = 0, ∀s ∈ SF .
Proof. Since F satisfies the generalized Simon’s promise, step 3 of Simon’s
algorithm results in a value F (z), and the first register is collapsed to the
state:
1√
2t
2t−1∑
(b1,··· ,bt)=0
|z ⊕ b1s1 ⊕ b2s2 +⊕ · · · ⊕ btst〉.
After applying Hadamard transform H⊗n like in step 4, the resulting state
is:
1√
2t
1√
2n
2n∑
y=0
( 2k−1∑
(b1,··· ,bk)=0
(−1)y·(z⊕b1s1⊕b2s2+⊕···⊕btst)
)
|y〉
=
1√
2t
1√
2n
2n∑
y=0
(−1)y·z[1 + (−1)y·s1 ][1 + (−1)y·s2] · · · [1 + (−1)y·st ]|y〉.
Thus, the measurement always yields a random y such that y · si = 0, ∀i =
1, 2, · · · , t. Since s1, s2 · · · , st denotes a basis of SF , we have y ∈ S⊥F .

Repeating the above steps 1-5 for O(n) times, one is expected to obtain
n−k independent vectors orthogonal to the period space SF . By solving the
corresponding system of linear equations, one is able to efficiently determine
the subspace SF , which is the of the solution space of the system of linear
equations.
3.2. Simon’s algorithm with unwanted collisions
Now we consider the more general situation, where F still has a nontrivial
period space SF , but besides the periods, F might have other collisions at
some points. That is, there may exist two points x and y such that F (x) =
F (y), but x⊕y /∈ SF . If there are too many such collisions, Simon’s algorithm
may not be able to solve the period space of F efficiently. However, if the
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number of collisions can be limited properly, the algorithm is still feasible.
To illustrate this, we define the following parameter:
ε(F ) = max
a∈{0,1}n\SF
Prx[F (x) = F (x⊕ a)],
where Prx[F (x) = F (x ⊕ a)] = |{x ∈ {0, 1}n|F (x) = F (x ⊕ a)}|/2n, repre-
senting the probability that F (x) = F (x + a) when x is chosen randomly
and uniformly from {0, 1}n. The parameter ε(F ) measures how far F is from
satisfying the generalized Simon’s promise. The following theorem gives the
relation between this parameter and the successful probability of Simon’s
algorithm.
Theorem 1. Suppose F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is a multiple-output Boolean
function with period space SF . If running Simon’s algorithm on F with cn
queries resulting in cn measurement outputs u1, u2, · · · , ucn, and S is the
solution space of the system of linear equations


y · u1 = 0
y · u2 = 0
...
y · ucn = 0,
then SF ⊆ S. Moreover, if ε(F ) ≤ p0 < 1 for some constant p0, then the
probability that SF ( S is at most
(
2(1+p0
2
)c
)n
.
Proof. We first prove that SF ⊆ S. Let s1, s2 · · · , st denote a basis of
SF . Suppose the measurement of step 3 in Simon’s algorithm gives a value
F (z). Besides the points {z⊕ b1s1⊕· · ·⊕ btst|b1 · · · bt ∈ {0, 1}}, F may have
other collisions at the value F (z). Suppose a is such a collision. That is,
F (z⊕ a) = F (z) and a /∈ SF , then for all b1, b2, · · · , bt ∈ {0, 1}, it holds that
F (z ⊕ a⊕ b1s1 ⊕ b2s2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ btst) = F (z ⊕ a) = F (z),
Thus, a⊕∑tj=1 bjsj also yields a collision of F at the point z. Since s1, · · · , st
is a basis of the subspace SF , for any two unequal collisions a1, a2 of F at
the point z, the sets
{a1⊕
t∑
j=1
bjsj|b1, b2, · · · , bt ∈ {0, 1}} and {a2⊕
t∑
j=1
bjsj|b1, b2, · · · , bt ∈ {0, 1}}
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either have no intersection or are completely equal. Therefore, the step 3
of Simon’s algorithm causes the first register to collapse into a state in the
following form:
1√
2t(q + 1)
( 2t−1∑
(b1,··· ,bt)=0
|z ⊕ b1s1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ btst〉+
2t−1∑
(b1,··· ,bt)=0
|z ⊕ a1 ⊕ b1s1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ btst〉+
· · · +
2t−1∑
(b1,··· ,bt)=0
|z ⊕ aq ⊕ b1s1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ btst〉
)
,
where a1, · · · , aq /∈ SF and F (ai ⊕ z) = F (z), ∀i = 1, 2, · · · , q. Let a0 = 0n,
the above formula is equal to
1√
2t(q + 1)
q∑
i=0
2t−1∑
(b1,··· ,bt)=0
|z ⊕ ai ⊕
t⊕
j=1
bjsj〉
After applying Hadamard transform H⊗n like in step 4, the state in the first
register is:
1√
2t+n(q + 1)
2n∑
y=0
q∑
i=0
2t−1∑
(b1,··· ,bt)=0
(−1)y·(z⊕ai⊕
⊕t
j=1 bjsj)|y〉
=
1√
2t+n(q + 1)
2n∑
y=0
( q∑
i=0
(−1)y·(z⊕ai))[1 + (−1)y···s1][1 + (−1)y···s2 ] · · · [1 + (−1)y···st ]|y〉.
Thus, the measurement always yields a random y such that y · si = 0, ∀i =
1, 2, · · · , t, which means that s1, s2 · · · , st are in the solution space S. Since
s1, · · · , st is a basis of SF , we have SF ⊆ S.
Then we prove that the probability that SF ( S is at most
(
2(1+p0
2
)c
)n
.
We need the following lemma, which is proved in [5].
Lemma 2. For a ∈ {0, 1}n, consider the Boolean function g(x) = 1
2n
∑
y∈{0,1}n
y·a=0
(−1)x·y.
For any x, it satisfies
g(x) =
1
2
(δx,0 + δx,a).
6
The probability that SF ( S is equal to
Pr[∃a ∈ {0, 1}n\SFs.t.u1 · a = u2 · a = · · · = ucn · a = 0]
≤
∑
a∈{0,1}n\SF
Pr[u1 · a = u2 · a = · · · = ucn · a = 0]
≤
∑
a∈{0,1}n\SF
(
Pr[u1 · a = 0]
)cn
≤(2n − |SF |) max
a∈{0,1}n\SF
Pr[u1 · a = 0]cn
≤ max
a∈{0,1}n\SF
(
2Pr[u1 · a = 0]c
)n
(1)
Now we compute Pr[u1 · a = 0]. If one waits until the last step before
measuring the both registers in Simon’s algorithm, the final state before the
measurement can be decomposed into:
1
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
∑
y ∈ {0, 1}n(−1)x·y|y〉|F (x)〉 = 1
2n
∑
y∈{0,1}n
y·a=0
∑
x∈{0,1}n
(−1)x·y|y〉|F (x)〉
+
1
2n
∑
y∈{0,1}n
y·a=1
∑
x∈{0,1}n
(−1)x·y|y〉|F (x)〉.
Thus the probability that measurement yields u such that u · a = 0 is
Pru[u · t = 0] = ‖ 1
2n
∑
y∈{0,1}n
y·a=0
∑
x∈{0,1}n
(−1)x·y|y〉|F (x)〉‖2
=2−2n
∑
y∈{0,1}n
y·a=0
∑
x,x′∈{0,1}n
(−1)(x⊕x′)·y〈F (x′)|F (x)〉
=2−2n
∑
x,x′∈{0,1}n
〈F (x′)|F (x)〉
∑
y∈{0,1}n
y·a=0
(−1)(x⊕x′)·y
=2−2n
∑
x,x′∈{0,1}n
〈F (x′)|F (x)〉2n−1(δx,x′ + δx′,x⊕a)
=
1
2n+1
[ ∑
x∈{0,1}n
〈F (x)|F (x)〉+
∑
x∈{0,1}n
〈F (x⊕ a)|F (x)〉
]
=
1
2
[
1 + Prx[F (x) = F (x⊕ a)]
]
. (2)
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Then according to Eq.(1) and Eq.(2), the conclusion holds.

According to Theorem 1, as long as c is not less than ⌈ln 2/ ln 2
1+p0
⌉,
the solution space S is equal to the period space SF except for a negligible
probability.
3.3. Using Simon’s algorithm to find linear structures
Still consider a multiple-output Boolean function F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m.
We define the following function
W : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m
(x , y) → F (x)⊕ y, (3)
If a is a linear of F , then there exist b such that F (x⊕ a)⊕ F (x) = b for
all x. We call vector (a, b) a linear structure pair of F . The linear structure
of F does not constitute a subspace because it is not closed under addition
over Fn2 . However, all linear structure pair of F constitute a subspace of n-
dimensional linear space over F2. For any two linear structure pairs (a1, b1),
(a2, b2),
F (x⊕ a1 ⊕ a2)⊕ F (x) = F (x⊕ a1) +⊕b2 ⊕ F (x) = b1 ⊕ b2.
Thus, the set of linear structure pairs of F closed under addition. We call the
subspace constituted by all linear structure pairs of F the linear structure
space of F , denoted LF . Note that (a, b) is a linear structure pair of F if and
only if (a, b) is a period of W . Therefore, the linear structure space LF of F
is actually the period space SW of W .
According to Theorem 1, we can use Simon’s algorithm to find the period
space of a Boolean function. Thus, we can obtain the linear structure space of
F by applying Simon’s algorithm on W . Based on this idea, we proposed the
following algorithm for finding all linear structure pairs of a given Boolean
function.
Algorithm FindStru
Input: c is constant chosen by the attacker. The quantum oracle access
of a Boolean function F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is given.
output: A basis of the linear structure space LF of F .
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1. Define the function W (x, y) = F (x)⊕ y as Eq.(3). Since the quantum
oracle of F is given, the oracle of W is accessible.
2. Run Simon’s algorithm on W with c(n +m) queries to get c(n +m)
measurement results u1, · · · , uc(n+m) ∈ {0, 1}n+m. Solve the system of
linear equations 

(x, y) · u1 = 0
(x, y) · u2 = 0
...
(x, y) · uc(n+m) = 0,
Suppose {(a1, b1), (a2, b2), · · · , (at, bt)} is the system of funda-
mental solutions of above equations, then output the set
{(a1, b1), (a2, b2), · · · , (at, bt)}.
To demonstrate the validity of Algorithm FindStru, we consider the
parameter ε(W ). By the definition of W , we have
ε(F ) = max
(a,b)∈{0,1}n+m\SW
Pr(x,y)[W (x, y) =W (x⊕ a, y ⊕ b)]
= max
(a,b)∈{0,1}n+m\LF
Pr(x,y)[F (x)⊕ F (x⊕ a) = b].
For any Boolean function F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, we define new parameter
δ(F ) = max
(a,b)∈{0,1}n+m\LF
Pr(x,y)[F (x)⊕ F (x⊕ a) = b]. (4)
To some exten, this parameter quantifies the distance of the linear structure
pairs of F to other vectors in {0, 1}n+m. According to Theorem 1 and the fact
that SW = LF , the smaller δ(F ) is, the greater the probability of Algorithm
2 successfully finding the linear structure space of F . Specifically, we have
the following theorem:
Theorem 2. Suppose F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is a multiple-output Boolean
function with linear structure space LF . If running Algorithm FindStru
on F with c(n +m) queries outputs {(a1, b1), (a2, b2), · · · , (at, bt)}, and L =
span{(a1, b1), (a2, b2), · · · , (at, bt)}, then LF ⊆ L. If δ(F ) ≤ p0 < 1 for some
constant p0, then the probability that LF ( L is at most
(
2(1+p0
2
)c
)n+m
.
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4. Quantum miss-in-the middle attack
The miss-in-the-middle technique is was proposed Biham, Biryukov, and
Shamir [9]. It is generally applied to impossible differential cryptanalysis
in classical cryptanalysis. The basic idea is that one finds two events that
propagate half way through the cipher top and bottom with certainty, but
which do not match in the middle. This results in an impossible differential.
Suppose E is a r-round block cipher with blocksize of n. Let F be the
first r − 1 rounds of E, and K be the key space of F , i.e. the subkey space
of the first r − 1 rounds of E. The inputs of F includes a key in K and a
plaintext x ∈ {0, 1}n. Fixing a specific key k ∈ K, the action of F on x is
denoted by Fk(x). Suppose Fk(x) = y, Fk(x
′) = y′, then ∆x = x⊕ x′ is the
input difference and ∆y = y⊕ y′ is the output difference. The pair (∆x,∆y)
is called a differential of Fk. (∆x,∆y) it is called an impossible differential
of Fk if it holds that
Fk(x⊕∆x)⊕ Fk(x) 6= ∆y, ∀x ∈ {0, 1}n.
Key-independent probability-1 differential is defined similarly. When execut-
ing an impossible differential cryptanalysis, the attacker first needs to find
some impossible differential (∆x,∆y) of Fk, and then sieve the subkey of the
last round using the found impossible differential. Since the actually used
key k is private, the attacker cannot access the Fk but only F . Therefore,
in classical impossible cryptanalysis, the attacker analyze the properties of
F and tries to find key-independent impossible differentials of F , which is
defined as following:
Definition 1. Suppose F : K ⊗ {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is a cipher with key space
K. (∆x,∆y) it is called an key-independent impossible differential of F if,
for any k ∈ K, any x ∈ {0, 1}n, it holds that
F (k, x⊕∆x)⊕ F (k, x) 6= ∆y.
In the quantum computing scenario, the attacker also cannot access quan-
tum oracle of Fk since he does not know the private key k. However, the
attacker can make quantum query to the encryption function F and tries
to find key-independent impossible differential of F like in classical scenario.
The miss-in-the-middle technique finds key-independent impossible differen-
tials by connecting two unmatched probability-1 differential paths. Specifi-
cally, for any v ∈ {1, · · · , r− 2}, we divide F into two parts: F = Fˇ (v) · Fˆ (v),
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where Fˆ (v) : Kv1 ⊗ {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n corresponds to the first v rounds of F ,
F˘ (v) : Kv2 ⊗ {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n corresponds to the last r − 1 − v rounds, and
K = Kv1⊗Kv2. If (∆x1,∆y1) and (∆x2,∆y2) are key-independent probability-
1 differentials of Fˆ (v) and (Fˇ (v))−1, respectively, and ∆y1 6= ∆y2, then
(∆x1,∆x2) will be an key-independent impossible differential of F . There-
fore, the miss-in-the-middle technique transforms the task of finding key-
independent impossible differentials into the task of finding key-independent
probability-1 differentials.
4.1. Quantum algorithm for finding probability-1 differentials
Note that [(∆x,∆y) is a key-independent probability-1 differential of
F ]⇔ [∀k ∈ K, (∆x,∆y) is a linear structure pair of Fk]⇔ [((0m,∆x),∆y) is
a linear structure pair of F : K ⊗ {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n]. Thus, when given a ci-
pher F with key space K, we can apply Algorithm FindStru on F to find its
key-independent probability-1 differentials. The only problem is that, when
applying Algorithm FindStru on F , we hope that the linear structure pair
((∆k,∆x),∆y) output by it satisfies that ∆k = 0m, where segment ∆k cor-
responds to the difference of key bits. Thus a minor modification is needed
when applying Algorithm FindStru. Suppose K = {0, 1}m, the algorithm
for finding key-independent probability-1 differentials is as following:
Algorithm FindPr1Diff
Input: c is constant chosen by the attacker. F : {0, 1}m ⊗ {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}n is a cipher with key space K = {0, 1}m. The quantum oracle
access of F is given.
output: Key-independent probability-1 differentials of F .
1. Define the function
W : {0, 1}m+2n → {0, 1}n
(k, x, y) → F (k, x)⊕ y = Fk(x)⊕ y.
Since the quantum oracle of F is given, the oracle of W is accessible.
2. Run Simon’s algorithm on W with c(2n+m) queries to get c(2n+m)
measurement results u1, · · · , uc(2n+m) ∈ {0, 1}2n+m. Solve the system
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of linear equations


(x, y) · (u1,m+1, u1,m+2 · · · , u1,2n+m) = 0
(x, y) · (u2,m+1, u2,m+2 · · · , u2,2n+m) = 0
...
(x, y) · (u2n+m,m+1, u2n+m,m+2 · · · , u2n+m,2n+m) = 0,
Suppose {(a1, b1), (a2, b2), · · · , (at, bt)} is the system of funda-
mental solutions of above equations, then output the set
{(a1, b1), (a2, b2), · · · , (at, bt)}.
Let L = span{(a1, b1), (a2, b2), · · · , (at, bt)}. The following theorem shows
that, except for a negligible probability, L is the set of all key-independent
probability-1 differentials of F .
Theorem 3. Suppose F : {0, 1}m ⊗ {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is a cipher with key
space K = {0, 1}m. If running Algorithm FindPr1Diff on F with c(2n+m)
queries outputs {(a1, b1), (a2, b2), · · · , (at, bt)}, and L = span{(a1, b1), (a2, b2),
· · · , (at, bt)}, then L contains all key-independent probability-1 differentials
of F . If δ(F ) ≤ p0 < 1 for some constant p0, then the probability that L
contains other vectors that are not key-independent probability-1 differential
of F is at most
(
2(1+p0
2
)c
)2n+m
.
Proof. Note that (a, b) is a solution of


(x, y) · (u1,m+1, u1,m+2 · · · , u1,2n+m) = 0
(x, y) · (u2,m+1, u2,m+2 · · · , u2,2n+m) = 0
...
(x, y) · (u2n+m,m+1, u2n+m,m+2 · · · , u2n+m,2n+m) = 0,
is equivalent to that (0, a, b) is a solution of


(k, x, y) · u1 = 0
(k, x, y) · u2 = 0
...
(k, x, y) · u2n+m = 0
k = 0m
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Combined with the fact that [(∆x,∆y) is a key-independent probability-
1 differential of F ] ⇔ [((0m,∆x),∆y) is a linear structure pair of F ], the
conclusion holds.

4.2. Quantum algorithm for finding impossible differentials
As mentioned earlier, for any v ∈ {1, · · · , r − 2}, we divide F into
two parts: F = Fˇ (v) · Fˆ (v), and the key space is accordingly divided to
K = Kv1⊗Kv2. If (∆x1,∆y1) and (∆x2,∆y2) are key-independent probability-
1 differentials of Fˆ (v) and (Fˇ (v))−1, respectively, and ∆y1 6= ∆y2, then
(∆x1,∆x2) will be an key-independent impossible differential of F . There-
fore, by applying Algorithm FindPr1Diff on Fˆ (v) and (Fˇ (v))−1 to obtain
key-independent probability-1 differentials of them respectively, one is able
to find key-independent impossible differentials of F . Given a cipher F with
key space K = {0, 1}m, the algorithm for finding key-independent impossible
differentials of F is as following:
Algorithm FindImDiff
Input: c is constant chosen by the attacker. F : {0, 1}m ⊗ {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}n is a cipher with key space K = {0, 1}m.
output: Key-independent impossible differentials of F .
1. For v = 1, 2, · · · , r−2, divide F into two parts: F = Fˇ (v) ·Fˆ (v), and the
key space to K = Kv1 ⊗Kv2 as described above. Since the construction
of F is public, the quantum oracle of each Fˇ (v) and Fˆ (v) is accessible.
Then for each v = 1, 2, · · · , r − 2, do the following:
1-1.Apply Algorithm FindPr1Diff on Fˆ (v) and key space Kv1 with
parameter c, obtaining the set A(v).
1-2.Apply Algorithm FindPr1Diff on (Fˇ (v))−1 and key space Kv2
with parameter c, obtaining the set B(v).
2.Initialize set H to an empty set. For v = 1, 2, · · · , r−2, do the following:
∀(∆x1,∆y1) ∈ spanA(v) with ∆x1 6= 0, ∀(∆x2,∆y2) ∈ spanB(v) with
∆x2 6= 0, If ∆y1 6= ∆y2, Let H = H ∪ {(∆x1,∆x2)}.
3.Output the set H .
Note that although Algorithm FindImDiff needs the access to the quan-
tum oracle of F , the attacker need not quantum query to the block cipher
13
E or the reduced version Fk with right key. (The attacker does need classi-
cal queries to the whole block cipher E in the key-recovery phase.) That is
because the quantum oracle of F can be construct by the attacker himself
using the public knowledge of F . Our attack does not require the ability to
query the encryption function in superposition states.
4.3. Analysis of the algorithm
In this subsection, we analyze the validity and complexity of Algorithm
FindImDiff. To justify the validity of Algorithm FindImDiff, we define
the following parameter:
δˆ(F ) = max{δ(Fˆ (V )), δ(Fˇ (v)) : 1 ≤ v ≤ r − 2},
where δ(Fˆ (v)), δ(Fˇ (v)) are defined as in Eq.(4). According to Theorem 3, we
have following theorem.
Theorem 4. Suppose F : {0, 1}m ⊗ {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is a cipher with key
space K = {0, 1}m, and δˆ(F ) ≤ p0 < 1 for some constant p0. If running
Algorithm FindIm1Diff on F with 2c(r − 2)(2n + m) queries outputs H,
then the probability that H contains the vectors that are not key-independent
impossible differential of F is at most 2
(
2(1+p0
2
)c
)2n+m
.
Theorem 4 shows that except for a negligible probability, every vectors in
H is an key-independent impossible differential of F . In fact, as long as F has
a key-independent impossible differential (∆x1,∆x2) that is connected by two
unmatched probability-1 differentials, then there must be δy1,∆y2 such that
∆y1 6= ∆y1, and (∆x1,∆y1) and (∆x2,∆y2) are key-independent probability-
1 differentials of Fˆ (v) and (Fˇ (v))−1 respectively for some v ∈ {1, 2, · · · , r−2}.
According to Theorem 3, (∆x1,∆y1) must be in spanA
(v), and (∆x2,∆y2)
must be in spanB(v). Thus (∆x1,∆x2) must be inH . Therefore, any nontriv-
ial key-independent impossible differential of F that are connected by two un-
matched probability-1 differentials can be find by Algorithm FindIm1Diff.
Therefore, in some degree, we can say that our quantum miss-in-the-middle
technique always works for the block cipher if the classical miss-in-the-middle
technique works for it.
we compare Algorithm FindIm1Diff with classical miss-in-the-middle
technique. The miss-in-the-middle technique requires to find two unmatched
probability-1 differentials. In classical cryptanalysis, the attacker looks for
probability-1 differentials always by searching for probability-1 differential
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characteristics. Since the probability of differential characteristics generally
decrease greatly as the increase of the number of rounds, finding probability-1
differential characteristics becomes more and more difficult when the number
of rounds increases. However, Algorithm FindIm1Diff treats Fˆ (v) and Fˇ (v)
as a whole and cares only the input and output differences at their both
ends. Algorithm FindIm1Diff suffers from smaller effect of the increase of
the number of rounds, compared with the conventional miss-in-the-middle
technique.
To analyze the complexity of Algorithm FindIm1Diff, suppose Kv1 =
{0, 1}lv , Kv2 = {0, 1}hv, then the total number of quantum universal gates
required by Algorithm FindIm1Diff is
r−2∑
v=1
{
cn
[
2(lv + 2n) + (|Fˆ (v)|Q + n)
]
+ cn
[
2(hv + 2n) + (|(Fˇ (v))−1|Q + n)
]}
=10cn2(r − 2) +
r−2∑
v=1
cn
[
2(lv + hv) + (|Fˆ (v)|Q + |Fˇ (v)|Q)
]
=10cn2(r − 2) + (r − 2)cn|F |Q + 2(r − 2)cnm
=c(r − 2)(10n2 + 2mn + n|F |Q) ∈ poly(n).
Running Algorithm FindPr1Diff on Fˆ (v) needs 2n + lv + n = 3n + lv
qubits. Running Algorithm FindPr1Diff on (Fˇ (v))−1 needs 2n + hv + n =
3n+hv qubits. Since lv, hv ≤ m and the qubits can be reused, 3n+m qubits
are sufficient for executing Algorithm FindPr1Diff.
5. Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we apply Simon’s algorithm to the miss-in-the-middle tech-
nique and propose a quantum algorithm for finding impossible differentials
for general block ciphers. Our algorithm does not require quantum queries to
the block cipher, and need only polynomial qubits and universal gates. We
proved that, as long as the traditional miss-in-the-middle attack works for
the block cipher, the proposed quantum algorithm will work as well. Com-
pared with traditional miss-in-the-middle technique, the quantum version of
miss-in-the-middle technique proposed in this paper is less affected by the
increase in the number of rounds.
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